Robust mechanisms for bilateral trade under discrete types
Tarih: -
Konum: A216
Speaker: Mr. Kamyar Kargar
Abstract: In general, mechanism design is about investigating the necessary and sufficient conditions to achieve desired social, environmental or economic outcomes under many assumptions such as individuals’ self-interest and incomplete information. One of the well-known problem in the mechanism design literature is “Bilateral Trading problem”. Bilateral trade problem is the most common market interaction in which a seller and a buyer bargain over an indivisible object, and the valuation of each agent about the object is private information.
This talk will discuss mechanisms for bilateral trade problem under Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility and Ex-post Individual Rationality properties. The talk will also consider ambiguity in the problem framework and derive robust counterparts for the proposed objective function under box and φ-divergence ambiguity specifications.
Bio: Kamyar Kargar is a PhD candidate in Department of Industrial Engineering at Bilkent University. He received his B.Sc. and M.Sc. in Industrial Engineering from Tabriz University and Tehran TMU University, respectively. His current research interests focus on Game theory and Mechanism design under uncertainty and their applications, data driven and distributionally robust optimization.